Game Theoretic Approaches in Vehicular Networks: A Survey by Sun, Zemin et al.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 13, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2014 1
Game Theoretic Approaches in Vehicular Networks:
A Survey
Zemin Sun, Yanheng Liu, Jian Wang, Member, IEEE Carie Anil, Dongpu Cao, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), vehicles
and other intelligent components in Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) are connected, forming the Vehicular Networks
(VNs) that provide efficient and secure traffic, ubiquitous access
to information, and various applications. However, as the number
of connected nodes keeps increasing, it is challenging to satisfy
various and large amounts of service requests with different
Quality of Service (QoS ) and security requirements in the
highly dynamic VNs. Intelligent nodes in VNs can compete
or cooperate for limited network resources so that either an
individual or a group objectives can be achieved. Game theory, a
theoretical framework designed for strategic interactions among
rational decision-makers who faced with scarce resources, can
be used to model and analyze individual or group behaviors of
communication entities in VNs. This paper primarily surveys
the recent advantages of GT used in solving various challenges
in VNs. As VNs and GT have been extensively investigate34d,
this survey starts with a brief introduction of the basic concept
and classification of GT used in VNs. Then, a comprehensive
review of applications of GT in VNs is presented, which primarily
covers the aspects of QoS and security. Moreover, with the
development of fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication,
recent contributions of GT to diverse emerging technologies of
5G integrated into VNs are surveyed in this paper. Finally, several
key research challenges and possible solutions for applying GT
in VNs are outlined.
Index Terms—Game theory, vehicular networks, quality of
service, security, 5G
I. MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES
Internet of things (IoT) is seen as the most promising
technology to realize the vision of connecting things at any
time, from any place to any network, and continues to be a
hot pot of the research. Integrating IoT technologies to vehicles
and infrastructures, Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
aims to improve traffic safety, relieve traffic congestion and in-
crease energy efficiency by providing real-time information for
road users and transportation system operators [1]. Vehicular
networks (VNs) has been regarded as an important component
of the development of the ITS for intelligent decision makings
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by communicating with other vehicles (V2V) or infrastructures
(V2I) [2].
However, the salient characteristics of VNs such as high-
mobility of vehicles, unstable network topology, and constraint
resources (e.g., power, frequency spectrum, and bandwidth)
pose severe challenges to decision makings of different in-
telligent devices (e.g., vehicles and Road-Side Units (RSUs))
in dynamic environments. For example, RSUs make decisions
on resource allocation to improve resource utilization while
minimizing computational overheads and energy consumption.
Besides, resource consumers such as vehicles make decisions
to either selfishly compete for limited resources or cooperate
with others to maximize the overall network performance.
Moreover, to make the communication secure against the self-
ish behaviors or attacks of malicious nodes, intelligent devices
in VNs should make efficient defense decisions. Game theory
(GT) [3] provides mathematical models for the optimization
of complex issues where multi-players with contradictory
objectives compete for limited resources or cooperate for
maximizing common interests. Therefore, this paper provides
a systematic survey on applications of GT in modeling the
strategic behaviors of intelligent nodes in VNs.
VNs have been extensively studied in different contexts, and
the recently published surveys cover many aspects of the VNs.
Several surveys focus on the Quality-of-Service (QoS) of VNs
involving the protocols of Medium Access Control (MAC)
[4] and network layers [5], routing algorithms [6], content
delivery solutions [7], and energy harvesting techniques [8].
Furthermore, considering the vulnerability of VNs to various
attacks, several research investigate security [9], privacy [10],
[11], and trust [12] aspects of VNs. The researchers in [13]
gave a comprehensive overview covering the fundamentals of
VNs and the three security-related topics: security, privacy, and
trust. With the development of the proposed fifth-generation
(5G) communication architecture [14], some surveys targeted
at the specific technologies integrating with VNs including
vehicular edge computing (VEC) [15], [16], big-data-driven
VNs [17], Vehicular cloud networks [18], unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV)-assisted VNs [19], and heterogeneous vehic-
ular networks (HVNETs) [20], [21]. However, these papers
mainly focus on characteristics, requirements, attacks, and
corresponding solutions for VNs but with little coverage on
challenges of decision making mentioned above in VNs.
Although GT has been used with significant success to de-
sign the interactions of competitive and cooperative behaviors
among players, existing survey papers on GT focus mostly
on either the overview [22], [23] and security aspects [24]–
[26] of wireless networks or single technology-based wireless
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networks [27], [28]. For example, a survey of GT based
solutions for radio resource allocation optimization in fourth-
generation (4G) wireless networks is presented in [22]. GT
applying in solving challenges in emerging wireless commu-
nications such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), Device to
Device (D2D), Cognitive Radio VNs (CR-VN), and sensor
networks are summarized in [23]. Moreover, surveys in [27]
and [28] uniquely focus on the game-theoretic approaches for
dealing with the issues in UAV-assisted wireless networks and
multi-access edge computing wireless networks, respectively.
Besides, several survey papers address the application of GT
in decision making of cyber security and privacy protection
in wireless networks [24]–[26]. Although GT approaches in
VNs is introduced in [29], the paper mainly gives a brief
introduction of the GT employed for modeling the interaction
between the attacker and defender in VNs. Little survey work
has been carried out comprehensively for applications of GT
in VNs. The classification of related surveys and the research
gap are shown in Table. II.
The focus of this paper is to provide a comprehensive
survey of the current research on GT approaches in solving
the challenges facing VNs. The main contributions can be
summarized as:
• Providing a comprehensive overview of the existing ap-
plications of GT in improving the performance of VNs
from the perspectives of QoS guarantee and security
protection.
• Discussing the GT applied to solve the challenges in next-
generation VNs integrating with 5G-based technologies
such as edge computing, heterogeneous networks, UAV-
assisted communications, and SDN technologies.
• Outlining the remaining challenges and future researches
that help to advance the development of GT in VNs.
Fig. 1 illustrates the organization of this survey. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. Section II-A briefly
introduces the background of GT. Section II reviewed and
organized the GT solutions for the challenges of current VNs.
Section III further investigates the applications of GT in VNs
with 5G-based technologies. Section IV highlights the key
challenges and future works. The paper is concluded in Section
V. The abbreviations in this paper are listed in Table I.
II. APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY IN CURRENT VNS
As GT has been extensively investigated, this section starts
with a brief introduction of the basic concept and classification
of GT used in VNs. Furthermore, related researches on appli-
cations of GT in VNs are introduced from the perspectives of
security protection and QoS guarantee, respectively.
A. Background of Game theory
GT is a branch of applied mathematics for analyzing
the strategic interactions among multiple decision-makers
(players) [3]. These decision-makers cooperatively or com-
petitively take rational actions that have conflicting conse-
quences. A classical game can be defined as a triplet G =
(N, (Si)i∈N, (Ui)i∈N), where:
• N = 1, ...N is a finite set of N players
TABLE I
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND CORRESPONDING DEFINITIONS
Symbols Description
IoT Internet of Things
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
VN Vehicular Networks
V2V Vehicle to Vehicle
V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure
RSU Road-Side Unit
GT Game Theory
5G Fifth Generation
QoS Quality of Service
MAC Medium Access Control
4G Fourth Generation
MEC Mobile Edge Computing
D2D Device to Device
NE Nash Equilibrium
BNE Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
DoS Denial of Service
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IPS Intrusion Prediction System
IRS Intrusion Reaction System
CH Cluster Head
CH-IDS Coalition Head with Intrusion Detection Head
LIDS Local Intrusion System Detection
GDS Global Decision System
GIDS Global Intrusion Detection System
IDA Intrusion Detection Agent
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
LA Learning Automata
NBS Nash Bargaining Solution
CR Cognitive Radio
MANETs mobile ad hoc networks
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
V2R Vehicle-to Roadside
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
CSMA/CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance
BSM Basic Safety Message
CBR Channel Busy Ratio
DCC Decentralized Congestion Control
SU Secondary User
PU Primary User
SINR Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio
MEC Mobile Edge Computing
HetVNET Heterogeneous Vehicular Network
SDN Sofware Defined Network
UAV Umanned Assisted Vehicles
VEC Vehicular Edge Computing
VC Vehicular Cloud
FC Fog Computing
VFC Vehicular Fog Computing
CC Cloud Computing
SP Service Provider
VM Virtual Machine
QoE Quality of Experience
ECD Edge Computing Device
VFN Vehicular Fog Node
F-SBS Fog-Small-BS
HetVNETs Heterogeneous Vehicular Networks
LTE Long Term Evolution
DSRC Dedicated short-range communication
ROS Requirement of Service
CP Content Provier
MNO Multiple Network Operators
OBUs On Board Units
V2U Vehicle-to-UAV
HP High Priority
LP Low Priority
mmWave Millimeter-wave (mmWave)
ISPs Internet Service Providers
LSA Licensed Shared Access
RL Reinforce Learning
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Section II
Background of Game
Theory
Section III
Application of Game Theory
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Section V
Challenges
Section IV
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VNs
Game Theory for 
Security 
Protection in VNs
Game Theory for 
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in VNs
GT for routing 
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GT for Privacy
preserving
GT for trust
management
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security
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Game Theory in 
Vehicular Edge 
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Handover 
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Efficiency of
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Security in VNs
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Fig. 1. Organization of the survey on applications of GT in VNs
• (Si)i∈N is the strategy set of player i, and si ∈ Si is any
possible strategy of i
• (Ui)i∈N) is the utility (or payoff) function of player i.
Each player in the game aims to maximize its payoff
function according to other players strategies
A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium (NE), if for each
player i ∈ N
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
) ≥ ui (si, s∗−i ) , ∀si ∈ Si, (1)
where s∗−i is the strategy vector of all players except player
i. This is the maximum utility function of player i over the
set of all its strategies. In this case, each player obtains the
optimal utilities, and none of the users has an incentive to
deviate because it can not unilaterally change its strategy to
increase his utility.
Classical GT can be classified into two main categories:
non-cooperative and cooperative games. Non-cooperative
game is most widely-used in resource competition or attacker
detection due to the simplicity for problem modeling and
solution. Besides, the cooperative game has been applied in
the resource allocation or sharing problems in VNs. Because
the details of GT have been investigated by a lot of surveys
or studies on wireless networks [22]–[29], [31]–[34], we skip
the introduction of GT by summarizing the taxonomies and
applications of GT corresponding to this paper in Table III.
B. Game Theory for Security Protection in VNs
The features of VNs may result in security vulnerabilities
that make the communication suffer from various kinds of
internal and external attacks, which have caused three main
concerns in the design of secure VNs: security, privacy and
trust. This section introduces the use of GT in intrusion
or misbehavior detection [35], [36], [64], [65], [75], [89],
privacy preservation [37], [38], [77], [116]–[119], and trust
management [39], [40], [80], [90]–[92], [104] in VNs.
1) GT for cyber security: Buinevich et al. [121] listed the
top 10 most severe cyber-attacks facing VNs, which are cate-
gorized as threats to confidentiality, availability, and integrity.
For confidentiality attacks, malicious nodes aim to find the
Cluster Head (CH) and its sensitive data by eavesdropping
the communication within its radio range [64]. Regarding
the availability attack (e.g., Denial of Service (DoS)), the
adversaries attempt to exhaust the bandwidth resources by
disturbing or jamming the communications [122]. Attacks
targeting the communication integrity try to inject false in-
formation, change the order of messages, or replay the old
messages [123]. Consequently, it is essential to provide a
reliable security framework for VNs to deter these cyber
attacks. The frameworks developed for VN cyber security can
be classified into Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion
Prediction System (IPS), and Intrusion Reaction System (IRS)
[124], [125].
IDS or IPS is reliable to detect malicious vehicles and is
often used as a second line of defense after the cryptographic
systems [126], [127]. GT can be used as a method for
modeling the interaction between malicious nodes and the
intrusion decision agent. Moreover, it is proved that GT is
useful in increasing the detection or prediction accuracy and
decreasing the communication overhead. Table. IV classifies
the related works on cyber security games for VNs according
to the deployed game models and cyber security frameworks.
Mabrouk et al. [89] introduced a coalition and signaling
game-theoretical method for internal malicious nodes detec-
tion in VNs. By using the coalitional game [128], vehicles
are organized into coalitions, each of which are composed
of member vehicles and a Coalition Head that equipped
with an Intrusion Detection System (CH-IDS). The interaction
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TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF RELATED SURVEYS
Title Published Year
VN Related Surveys
Secure authentication and privacy-preserving techniques in Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETworks (VNs) [10]
Vehicular Communications 2020
Vehicular edge computing and networking: A survey [15] arXiv 2019
Computation offloading and content caching delivery in vehicular edge com-
puting: A survey [16]
arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.07803
5G for vehicular communications [14] IEEE Communications Magazine 2018
Vehicular communications: A network layer perspective [5] IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
A survey on recent advances in vehicular network security, trust, and privacy
[13]
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Big data driven vehicular networks [17] IEEE Network
Drone assisted vehicular networks: Architecture, challenges and opportunities
[19]
IEEE Network
A survey on pseudonym changing strategies for vehicular ad-hoc networks [11] IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 2017
Routing in vehicular ad-hoc networks: A survey on single-and cross-layer design
techniques, and perspective [6]
IEEE Access
Vehicular cloud networks: Challenges, architectures, and future directions [18] Vehicular Communications
Soft-defined heterogeneous vehicular network: Architecture and challenges [20] IEEE Network 2016
Vehicular networks: A new challenge for content-delivery-based applications
[7]
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Energy harvesting in vehicular networks: A contemporary survey [8] IEEE Wireless Communications
Trust management for vehicular networks: An adversary-oriented overview [12] IEEE Access
A survey on hybrid MAC protocols for vehicular ad-hoc networks [4] Vehicular communications
Heterogeneous vehicular networking: A survey on architecture, challenges, and
solutions [21]
IEEE communications surveys & tutorials 2015
GT Related Surveys
A survey on the combined use of optimization methods and game theory [30] Archives of Computational Methods in Engineering 2020
Cyber security game for intelligent transportation systems [24] IEEE Network 2019
A game-theoretic taxonomy and survey of defensive deception for cybersecurity
and privacy [25]
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A Survey of game theory in unmanned aerial vehicles communications [27] IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Game theory for multi-access edge computing: Survey, use cases, and future
trends [28]
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 2018
Survey of game theory and future trends with application to emerging wireless
data communication networks [23]
Researchgate. net/publication 2017
Game theory for cyber security and privacy [26] ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Review on radio resource allocation optimization in LTE/LTE-advanced using
Game Theory [22]
International Journal of Communication Networks and Informa-
tion Security (IJCNIS)
GT for Security of VNs
When GT meets VN’s security and privacy [29] Proceedings of the 14th International conference on advances
in mobile computing and multi media
2016
GT in VNs
Game theory approaches in vehicular networks: A survey This paper
between the CH-IDS agent and vehicle member is modeled
as a signaling game. The CH-IDS performs the optimal
strategy Idle, or De f end based on the pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy BNEs to defend the malicious vehicles’ attack
dynamically. This scheme relies only on the current behaviors
of attackers in the VNs and cannot predict future misbehaviors.
To predict the malicious behavior in VNs, Sedjelmaci et al.
[75] proposed a Bayesian game-theoretic intrusion detection
and prevention scheme that can predict the future behaviors of
the monitored vehicles. The vehicles within the communica-
tion range of the monitored vehicle monitor its behavior when
it broadcasts an alert message. The RSU and the suspected
vehicle begin to play a Bayesian game if a malicious behavior
of the monitored vehicle is detected, t. The RSU could perform
detect or wait and the monitored vehicle could Attack or Wait
(i.e., don’t wait). As a result, it is proved that there is a mixed
strategy BNE {RSU (Detect, p∗) , Attacker (Attack, q∗)} in
which the malicious vehicle attacks when the probability
q > q∗ and the RSU triggers its detection action when p < p∗.
In this case, the suspected vehicle can be predicted as an
attacker and be stored into the blacklist by the RSU. The
experiments demonstrated that this scheme has high rate of
detection (> 98%) and low rate of false-positive (< 2%). The
weakness of this method is that it only focuses on detecting
the false alert’s generation attack but does not consider other
types of attacks facing the VNs.
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TABLE III
TAXONOMY AND APPLICATIONS OF GT IN VNS
Games
Cyber
Secu-
rity
Privacy Trust Routing
MAC
Layer
Access
Power
Con-
trol
Spectrum
Resource
Allocation
VEC HetVNET SDN-basedVNs
UAV-
assisted
VNs
Others
N
on
-c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e
General [35],[36]
[37],
[38]
[39],
[40] [41]–[46]
[47]–
[50]
[45],
[46],
[51],
[52]
[53]–[59] [60],[61]
[62],
[63]
Stackelberg [64],[65]
[66]–
[69] [70]–[73]
Network
slicing
[74]
B
ay
es
ia
n General [75],[76] [77] [78] [79]
Signaling [80] [81] [82]
Auction [83]
One-shot [84]
Mean Field [85]
Congestion [86] LSA[87]
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e General [88]
Coalitional [89] [90] [91],[92]
[44], [93],
[94] [95]
[96],
[97]
Bargain [98] [99] [100] [101]
Potential [102],[103]
Evolutionary [104] [105] [106] [107] [108]
Matching [109],[110]
[111]–
[113]
D2D
[114],
mmWave
[115]
TABLE IV
GAME MODELS FOR CYBER SECURITY IN VNS
Security
games Game type Player and Strategy Solution
Role
IDS IPS IRS
[89] Coalition game
Signaling game
CH-IDS agent: {Idle, Def end}
Vehicle member: {Attack,Cooperateright }
Pure-strategy and mixed-strategy BNEs
√
[75] Bayesian game RSU: {Detect,Wait }
Attacker: {Attack,Wait }
Mixed strategy BNE
√ √
[35] Non-cooperative game LIDS {Detect,Wait }
vehicles members: {Attack, Benormal }
Pure strategy NE
√
[36] Non-cooperative game IDS: {Monitor, Not Monitor }
Malicious vehicle:{Attack,Wait }
Mixed strategy NE
√
[64], [65] Hierarchical Stackelberg game IDA: launching strategies of the secondary agents
Secondary agents (IDS,IPS,IRS):
{IDS, IPS, IRS }
NE
√ √ √
[120] Zero-sum game Attacker: {Attack, Stop}
Honest vehicle:{Continue,Changedirection}
Pure strategy NE
√
[76] Bayesian Game Target node: {attack, notattack }
Benign player:{vote, abstain}
Pure-strategy and Mixed-strategy BNEs
√
Sedjelmaci et al. [35] further developed a lightweight hybrid
IDS for VNs considering both the mobility of vehicles and
various types of attacks, neither of which were considered
in their previous work [75]. Three intrusion detection agents
are considered in the hybrid IDS framework: Local Intrusion
Detection System (LIDS) at the cluster member level, Global
Intrusion Detection System (GIDS) at the CH level, and Global
Decision System (GDS) at RSU level. At the LIDS level, a
game is designed for a cluster member and vehicles located
at its radio range; the monitoring process can be activated
if the cluster member reaches a NE. This detection scheme
outperforms VWCA [129], IDFV [130], and T-CLAIDS [131]
in terms of attack detection accuracy (i.e. detection and false-
positive rates), detection time, and communication overhead.
There is a trade-off between collecting more information
for effective intrusion detection and the high volume IDS
traffic in VNs. A multi-layered IDS for VN based on GT
is designed in [36] to achieve a satisfied tradeoff between
QoS and security. The interaction between the IDS and the
malicious vehicle is modeled as a two-player non-cooperative
game. The strategy spaces of the CH and the malicious
vehicle are {Monitor, Not Monitor} and = {Attack,Wait},
respectively. The mixed-strategy NE of the game is obtained
as (p∗, q∗), where p∗ and q∗ are the probabilities that the
malicious vehicle and the CH conduct Attack and Monitor ,
respectively. By adopting the monitoring strategies based on
the NE, the volume of IDS traffic is significantly reduced while
maintaining a satisfied detection rate and accuracy.
The cyber defense game [64], [65] for VNs takes the
works in [36] and [75] a step further by using a hierarchical
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF LOCATION PRIVACY GAMES IN VNS
Game players Location privacy metric Description Attack
model
Description
[38]
n vehicles in the
mix zone
P =
∑N
d=1 pd |b log2 pd |b −
(
− log2 1Θ
)
• N : the number of players
• Pb |d the probability that the new pseudonym d of a
specific vehicle is correctly linked by the attacker to
its old pseudonym b
• Θ :eavesdropping station
Passive
attacker
Eavesdrop
[77]
N i
Υ
vehicles lo-
cated in the mix
zone
Bi
Υ
= −∑NiΥ
d=1 Pd |b log2 Pd |b
• N i
Υ
: the number of vehicles (located in the mix zone
of Y) during the i th round
• Pd |b: the probability that the new pseudonym d ∈
D of a specific vehicle is correctly linked by the
attacker to its old pseudonym b ∈ B
Active
attacker
Relate the target vehicles
old pseudonym to its new
pseudonym
[132]
Defender and at-
tacker
LPi (t) = LPMi − LPLTi (t)
LPMi = log2 n∀n ≥ 2
LPLTi (t) = x ∗
(
t − ts, i
) • LPMi : the last mix-zone location privacy for vehicle
i
• n: the number of vehicles cooperate in the mix-zone
• LPLTi (t): location privacy loss over time
• x: a constant for location privacy loss
• ts, i : last pseudonym change time
Naive
attacker
and
Stealthy
attacker
• Naive attacker: never co-
operates
• Stealthy attacker: at-
tempts to obtain the loca-
tion of a vehicle while not
being detected
[37]
Legitimate node
and malicious
node
Privacy(ϕ, f alse, hit, dp) =∑
r,r
′
ϕ(r) fake < r |r′ > hit < r̂, r > dp (̂r |r)
• ϕ(r): the probability that used by replacing the ve-
hicle’s real location information r with other false
location information
• f ake < r, r′ >: anonymity
• dp < r̂, r >: the premises of the know strategies of
the players
Active
attacker
Relate the target vehicles
old pseudonym r̂ to its ob-
served new pseudonym r′
Stackelberg game. Not only does it consider the tradeoff
between security and the overhead of IDS, but it integrates
the functions of IDS, IPS, and Intrusion Reaction System
(IRS) for detection, prediction, and reaction. This hierarchical
game is played by an intrusion decision agent (IDA) (leader)
and the secondary agents (i.e., IDS, IPS, and IRS). The IDA
aims at balancing the communication quality and security by
deciding the optimal activation of IDS, IPS, and IRS agents.
An extensive-form representation of the game is given based
on the payoff functions modeled for players. By solving the
game, the NE is obtained where the secondary players execute
the corresponding strategies activated by the IDS. This scheme
provides a new insight into the security game where IDS
adaptively actives the actions of secondary players to detect,
predict, or react against attacks with high accuracy, while
considering the communication delay and overhead.
The DoS attack detection in VNs is addressed in [120] by
modeling a zero-sum strategy game between the honest vehicle
and the attacker. The attacker has two options: Attackor Stop;
the honest vehicle can Continue driving or Changedirection
to move away from the attacker. Misbehaving nodes identi-
fication in ephemeral wireless networks is discussed in [76]
with a case study of VNs. A voting-based Bayesian game
between a benign node PLB and a target node PLT is
proposed. The strategies of PLB and PLT are {vote, abstain}
and {attack, notattack}, respectively. Moreover, incentives
are used in payoffs in order to promote cooperation in the
network. The pure-strategy and mixed-strategy BENs can help
neighboring nodes decide whether to discredit an accused
(target) vehicular node.
2) GT for privacy preserving: The privacy of vehicles
should be carefully considered besides intrusion or malicious
behaviors. The main concern for the privacy of a vehicle is the
location privacy since an adversary can track the locations of
vehicles by monitoring their pseudonyms. Anonymous authen-
tication is a common scheme for location privacy preservation
of vehicles in VNs, where vehicles temporally coordinate
pseudonym changes using a mix-zone strategy to guarantee
location privacy. To prevent the selfish motivations, several
works [77], [132], [132] use GT for stimulating cooperation
among the vehicles in a mix-zone. Table V presents the
comparisons of these location games.
Wang et al. [38] designed a non-cooperative game-based
pseudonym changing scheme to balance the location privacy
and the computation overhead in VNs. Each vehicle (player)
in the mix-zone [133] aims to maximize its location privacy
with minimum computation overhead. The player performs the
strategy Cooperate (change its pseudonym) or De f end (not
change its pseudonym). The vehicle’s utility is modeled as the
location privacy according to the entropy of uncertainty and
the eavesdropper’s location (which is given in Table V). The
NE strategy profile of the game is obtained corresponding to
the optimal number of cooperating players n∗. One weakness
of this study is the use of a complete information game. In
contrast, the incomplete information game could be better
to model the knowledge of players because vehicles in the
privacy-sensitive VNs do not know either the strategies or
payoffs of their opponents.
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In the non-cooperative games, vehicles only struggle to
maximize their payoffs and will be unwilling to change the
pseudonyms if they are satisfied with the current location
privacy. It makes the target vehicle vulnerable to the attacks
when more vehicles become selfish. Therefore, ”vehicles with
cooperative awareness” is the essential [116] for the location
privacy in VNs. Ying et al. [77] proposed a method called
Motivation for Protecting Selfish Vehicles’ Location Privacy
(MPSVLP) to encourage vehicles to cooperate in changing
their pseudonyms. In MPSVLP, vehicles form a mix zone
dynamically when their pseudonyms are close to expiration.
Moreover, an incentive mechanism is designed to encourage
vehicles to implement pseudonym changes according to ”rep-
utation credit”.
In [132], a formal game model between the attacker and
the defender is designed to analyze the impact of the attacker
on location privacy in VNs. On the one hand, two Byzantine
attackers that target location privacy in VNs are considered in
[132]: a naive attacker who never cooperates and a stealthy
attacker who attempts to obtain the location information of
a vehicle while not being detected. On the other hand, the
defender can cooperate to change its pseudonym because the
location privacy could suffer a loss over time (the model is
given in Table V); it can also be greedy and keep the old
pseudonym due to the cost of pseudonym change.
Fan et al. [37] focused on the game between the legitimate
node and the malicious node.The legitimate node replaces its
real location information r with a false location information r ′
and sends f ake < r, r
′
> to the service provider. On the other
hand, the malicious vehicle uses the received false location
information as prior knowledge to form a rational conjecture
hit < r, r
′
> to predict the location of the attacked vehicle. The
utilities of the legitimate player (i.e., location privacy metric)
and adversary player are given in Table. V. However, the study
only gives out maximization expressions of the players’ payoff
functions without NE solutions to the stated problem.
A few recent studies use GT to prove the security of
the privacy-preserving schemes in VNs. The security of the
proposed authentication interchange scheme is proved by a
valid argument using the strategies of attacker games in [116].
Studies in [117]–[119] establish the security of their proposed
privacy-preserving authentication schemes by defining a secu-
rity game played between an adversary and a challenger in
VNs.
3) GT for trust management : Trust management is
designed to prevent false information transmitted by dishon-
est communication entities [104], which is presented as a
potential alternative of secure communication in VNs [91].
Current trust evaluation models can be categorized as [134]:
1) entity-oriented, which identifies the trustworthiness of the
transmitter, usually based on interaction experience or neigh-
bors recommendations; 2) data-oriented, which identifies the
trustworthiness of transmitted messages; and 3) hybrid, which
incorporates entity-centric and data-centric methods.
• Node-oriented approach
Halabi and Zulkernine [91] designed a distributed trust coop-
eration game to protect the data integrity of vehicles in IoV.
Firstly, the vehicle’s trustworthiness is constructed using the
Bayesian inference model based on the previous interaction
experience. Moreover, a hedonic coalitional game [135] is
designed for collaborations among vehicles according to their
trustworthiness levels. The game is further solved by proposing
a trust-based coalition formation algorithm. One advantage of
this approach is that, since vehicles in the same coalition are
not required to re-compute the trustworthiness values each
time a new message is received, the computation overhead
is reduced significantly.
In [90], a dynamic trust model for IoT is constructed
where a set of neighbor vehicles and a monitored vehicle
are considered as players. In this model, the set of vehicles
form groups dynamically assigning and updating the trust
values of the monitored node according to the cooperativeness
and honesty values. An estimation algorithm is developed to
remove spams caused by neighboring attackers during the trust
value update. One weakness of this method is that the group
is assumed to be formed in advance without considering the
group formation process.
• Data-oriented approach
Kumar [92] proposed a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
based on the Bayesian coalition game where the Learning
Automata (LA) in the vehicles cooperate for information
sharing. The dynamic coalition is formed based on the players’
trust values formulated with symmetric key encryption and
hash-based message authentication. The environment decides
to reward or penalize the LAs according to their actions. Each
player further updates the strategy vector, deciding whether
to join a new coalition to improve communication security
according to the feedback of the environment. The proposed
scheme could resist against the replay and misauthentication
attacks and preserve the message integrity and authentication.
Mehdi et al. [39] proposed a game-based trust model to
identify the defender nodes and the malicious nodes in VNs.
The players can be tagged as a defender or malicious node
according to the trust level calculated using the informa-
tion provided by vehicles and RSUs (which is shown in
Table. II-B3). Furthermore, the strategies of the defender
and malicious node are defined as Detect/not Detect and
Attack/not Attack, respectively. And the payoff of each
player for any combination of strategies is calculated. The NE
is demonstrated where the defender can achieve satisfactory
communication and avoid potential attacks. One limitation is
that the trust model is based on a highway scenario without
considering situations with high vehicle density, such as an
urban environment.
• Hybrid approach
To encourage nodes to forward data actively, Fan and Wu
[40] produced an incentive reputation mechanism based on a
dynamic game. In this game, vehicle nodes are divided into
three clusters of players: normal, selfish, and malicious nodes,
each of which has its own strategy set. The RSU provides
an incentive mechanism for the nodes within its range, i.e.,
rewarding the players who adopt cooperative behaviors and
punishing those who are uncooperative. Vehicles in each
cluster choose the strategies to maximize their payoffs by
considering both the reward for cooperative behavior and
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF TRUST GAMES IN VNS
Schemes Ref. Game
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
D
is
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ut
ed
Trust metrics Description Attack resistance
Node
ori-
ented [91]
Coalition game
√ Trusti (VCm) =
∏
j∈VCm Ti j
Trusti : VCm → [0, 1]
Trust level of the coalition VCm as perceived
by vehicle Vi .
Data alteration attack
Data corruption attack
[90]
Assumed
coalition game
√ • Direct honesty: pd = D ∗ pnet
• Indirect honesty:pI = I ∗ pnet
• pD : the probability that the monitored node
makes honest transactions
• pnet: the probability related to the constraints
of the monitoring
• D: direct honesty rate
• pl : the probability that the monitored node
evaluates honestly the other nodes
• I : Indirect honesty rate
Spam
Data-
oriented [92]
Bayesian
coalition game
√ •
TV t = α × certrepPU t (init)
− β × certrevPU t (curr)
• PU t = cer t
curr∑n
i=0 cer t
tot
i
• certrev (t): Certificate revocation at time t
• certi (tot ): total number of certificates
• PU t (init): Initial payoff utility
• α, β:Constants with value between 0 and 1
• PU t (curr): Current payoff utility
Replay attack
Misauthentication
attack
[39]
Non-cooperative
game
√
Lt =
(
Ve, t − ET
) ∗ 100 • Lt : trust level of a node t• Ve .t : event level raging from 0 to 1 experience
based trust
Attacker prevention
without focusing on
specific attackers
Hybrid-
oriented [40] Dynamic game
√
IBRSU =
n1+n2−n3
n1+n2+n3
• IBRSU : recommendation value from RSU
• n1, n2, n3: the number of forwarding, receiving,
and releasing messages, respectively
Restrain vehicles from
selfish behaviors
[80] Signaling game
√
Distributed trust model (DTM2) Allocate credits to nodes and securely managethese credits
Prevent both malicious
and selfish vehicles
[104]
Evolutionary
game
√
fr ∈ {x |1 ≤ x ≤ 100, x | ∈ Z } fr : the deception intensity of dishonest vehicles Dynamic and varied at-tacking strategies
the cost for energy consumption. The entire VN reaches an
equilibrium after a definite number of evolution rounds of the
repeated game. The proposed mechanism can restrain selfish
behaviors and encourage vehicles to take cooperative actions.
Facing the dynamic of vehicles and the openness of commu-
nication channels in VNs, trust relationships among vehicles
should be constructed distributively without the reliance on
a central entity. Haddadou [80] proposed an infrastructure-
independent trust model (DTM2) to prevent both malicious
and selfish behaviors in VNs. The (DTM2) maintains credits
and allocates them to each vehicle. Firstly, selfish nodes are
motivated to cooperate for credits earning by establishing
the price for receiving messages. Furthermore, to detect the
malicious nodes, DTM2 constructs the cost of sending by
formulating signal values corresponding to the behaviors of
the nodes. Nodes whose messages are identified trustful will
be rewarded with credits. Lastly, the credit update process of
a vehicle is modeled as a Markov chain based on the vehicle’s
behavior.
Most of the credit management schemes mainly focus on
certain types of attacks with settled attacking behaviors, which
is insufficient to represent the real scenarios. In [104], a
dynamic and varied attacking strategy is designed to evaluate
the reputation of communication entities and trustworthiness
of messages. An evolutionary game is employed to analyze the
evolution of attackers’ strategies, where untrustworthy vehicles
will be removed from the network. The method enables
simultaneous detection the credibility of the received messages
and the trustworthiness of the communication vehicles.
C. Game Theory for QoS Guarantee in VNs
Exploiting available resources to maximize the overall QoS
of VNs, such as throughput improvement, is another challenge
in VNs. GT is capable of analyzing the behaviors of nodes to
help them decide the optimal strategies and further optimize
the performance of the network. The application of GT in QoS
guarantee for VNs has been studied in various ways, such
as designing cooperative routing, MAC protocols, spectrum
resource allocation, and power control.
1) GT for routing: GT has been widely applied for miti-
gating selfish behaviors of packet forwarding in wireless net-
works. However, maintaining stable routes in VNs is challeng-
ing due to the dynamic nature of the mobile vehicle. Routing
schemes in VNs can be categorized as relay-based, broadcast-
based, and cluster-based routings, which is illustrated in Fig.
2.
• Relay-based routing
Tian et al. [41] proposed a non-cooperative game-theoretic
method where the candidate relay nodes are treated as players
who aim to optimize the transmission quality with low energy
consumption. The utility function u j of each player j is
formulated by considering the trade-off between the received
benefit and the energy or power cost, which is given as (2). Ac-
cording to the game structure, a decentralized self-organized
algorithm is further proposed to adapt the decision-making
behavior of each player and learn their NE strategies from their
action-reward histories. The NE can preserve the transmission
reliability and maintains the overall power consumption at the
lower bound.
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(a) Relay-based routing (b) Broadcast-based routing (c) Cluster-based routing
Transmitter vehicle
Relay vehicle
Receiver vehicle
Transmitter vehicle
Broadcast vehicle Cluster head
Receiver vehicle
Transmitter vehicle
Receiver vehicle
Cluster member
Fig. 2. Routing schemes in VNs: (a) relay-based routing,(b) broadcast routing, (c) cluster-based routing
u j
(
s j(t)
)
= fj
(
s j(t)
) − gj (s j(t)) , (2)
where fj and gj denote the obtained benefit and the cost
incurred by the cooperation of the relay node j when adopting
the strategy sj(t) over time t, respectively.
To mitigate transmission failure, the authors in [42] pro-
posed a game-theoretic relay selection protocol to select
the cooperative node in the retransmission. This algorithm
stimulates nodes to cooperate by providing incentives and
selects the best relay nodes for retransmission of packets when
the communication link becomes unstable. The network can
converge into a Nash network in the highly dynamic VN
environment. This protocol shows lower transmission delays
compared to non-cooperative communications.
Suleiman et al. [84] employed the GT to demonstrate the
incentive-compatibility of the routing protocol for highway
applications in VNs. A fixed cellular network operator CO and
a set of vehicles V constitute the players of the game in the
highway scenario. On the one hand, CO chooses Incentivizing
Cooperation (IC) making credit-based bandwidth allocation
or Not Incentivizing Cooperation (NIC) fixing bandwidth
allocation. On the other hand, the strategy of any vehicle
(AVi ∈ V) is Cooperation (C) relaying other vehicles messages
or Not Cooperating (NC) dropping the messages. Satisfied
routing strategy can be obtained by NE, where the incen-
tive V2V routing complements V2I routing. However, this
method is infrastructure-based and only designed for highway
applications, which can not be applied to the infrastructure-
independent communications or the city scenarios.
In order to overcome the limitation of traditional Nash Bar-
gaining Solution (NBS) that lacks the complete information,
Kim [98] proposed a new opportunistic routing scheme for
dynamic VNs based on an iterative bargaining model. By
considering the timed game, the destination vehicle selects the
most adaptable routing path Γ with the minimum link cost:
Γ = arg min
{Pi,Pi ∈S}
∫ t=Te
t=Ts
log (L−Pk) dt (3)
where S is the set of established routing paths, and Pi is the ith
routing path from the source vehicle to the destination vehicle.
Ts and Te are the packet forwarding start time and end time,
respectively, and LP denotes the communication cost of each
link. The destination vehicle periodically updates the timed
reinforcement function to stimulate relay vehicles to select
desirable links globally.
• Broadcast-based routing
In VNs, the broadcast storm may happen when the network
is overwhelmed by continuous broadcast or rebroadcast traffic.
The simplest scheme of the broadcast is blind flooding [138],
where each vehicle node rebroadcasts the received messages
until all vehicles in the network receive the messages. How-
ever, in a high-dense network, flooding will cause a large
amount of redundant information, which obviously leads to
collision and congestion. On the other hand, in the environ-
ment with sparse traffic, a single forwarder can not maintain
the connection and reachability of the communication. There-
fore, cooperative forwarding is essential for vehicle nodes to
cover the network with a low frequency of rebroadcast.
Emergency message warning is highly time-critical and
requires a more intelligent broadcast mechanism with low
latency and high reliability. In [43], an emergency message
broadcast game is proposed that takes vehicle density and link
quality into account. In this scheme, each vehicle calculates
the link quality using the receiving power. Then, the proba-
bility of rebroadcasting the emergency message is determined
based on the NE. The proposed rebroadcast scheme obtains
low broadcast overhead and transmission delay compared to
blinding flooding.
To maximize reachability while minimizing delay and the
number of rebroadcasts of VNs, Assia et al. [44] designed
an effective rebroadcasting protocol. The authors presented an
adaptive algorithm by modeling cooperative forwarding as a
volunteers dilemma game. Based on the game, each vehicle
uses the received information such as speed and position to
decide whether to rebroadcast. Simulation results show that
this protocol outperforms prior work on the reachability, the
number of rebroadcasts, and the delay, especially in congested
areas.
• Cluster-based routing
Clustering can be considered as an efficient solution to
enhance the connectivity of VNs. The coalitional game is
considered as a potential approach for clustering formation.
It has been used in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [139]
because the concept of the cluster is compatible with the coali-
tion. However, the limited communication resources and high
mobility of vehicles make it difficult for vehicles to maintain
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TABLE VII
SUMMARY OF ROUTING GAMES IN VNS
Ref. Game Players Objective Main Idea Routing Scenario
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at
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n
C
ha
nn
el
M
od
el
Relay-based Routing
[41]
Non-
cooperative
game
Candidate relay
nodes
Optimize transmission
quality with low energy
consumption
Incentive best relay
selection Centralized Urban
√ √ √ √ √
[42]
Non-
cooperative
game
Neighbor nodes Retransmission in caseof network failure Best relay selection Centralized
−
[84]
”One shot
game”
A fixed cellular
network and ve-
hicles
Credit-based bandwidth
allocation
Best routing
selection among
V2I and/or V2V
techniques
Hybrid High-way
√ √ √ √ √
[98]
Bargaining
game Vehicles
Opportunistic routing
selection
Best routing selec-
tion Decentralized
− √ √
Broadcast-based Routing
[43]
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
Delay minimization
for emergency message
broadcast
Rebroadcast Decentralized − √ √ √
[44]
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
Reachability maximiza-
tion and delay mini-
mization
Rebroadcast Decentralized Grid-map
√ √ √
Cluster-based Routing
[94]
Coalitional
game Vehicles
Cluster stability main-
taining and link quality
improvement
Optimum cluster
formation and CH
selection
Decentralized City toll
√ √
[136]
Coalitional
game Vehicles
Trade-off between sta-
bility and efficiency of
communication
Optimum cluster
formation and CH
selection
Decentralized Crossroad
√ √
[137]
Coalitional
game Vehicles
Broadcast storm mitiga-
tion
Optimal cluster for-
mation and CH se-
lection
Hybrid Patialacity
√ √ √
[105]
Evolutionary
game
Clusters and ve-
hicles
Throughput
optimization for cluster
Routing stability
maintaining
Optimum cluster
formation and CH
selection
Hybrid Manhattangrid
√
[93]
Coalitional
game
One-hop neigh-
bors of RSU or
CH
Multi-hop routing opti-
mization
Dynamic cluster for-
mation and CH se-
lection
Hybrid Freewayand street
√ √ √
a balance between the cluster stability and communication
efficiency. The clustering protocols for VNs can be categorized
as centralized clustering based on a central controller (e.g.,
roadside unit), decentralized clustering based on V2V com-
munication, or hybrid clustering which incorporates the above
two protocols. However, centralized clustering is not flexible
for VNs because it is dependent on the roadside infrastructure.
Therefore, most of the recent GT-based clustering schemes
for VNs aim to balance the cluster stability and clustering
efficiency using decentralized [94], [136] or hybrid clustering
[93], [105], [137].
Sulistyo et al. [94] proposed a stable clustering method for
V2V communication based on the coalitional game to improve
the channel capacity. In the game, each vehicle aims to form a
cluster by establishing V2V links with its neighbors based on
the coalition values. The coalition value is formulated as the
function of SNR, link lifetime, and velocity difference among
vehicles, all of which quantifies the V2V communication
quality. Based on the coalition value, vehicles can decide
whether to establish a new connection so that to obtain a good
trade-off between cluster stability and communication quality.
Focusing on crossroad scenarios, Huo et al. [136] presented
a coalition game-based clustering strategy considering both
efficiencies of communication and stability of the cluster. The
vehicles make decisions whether to switch to a new coalition
according to the coalition utility, which is formulated by the
relative velocity, relative position, and the bandwidth avail-
ability ratio of vehicles. The coalition formation can converge
to a Nash-stable partition, in which case the bandwidth of the
CH can be fully utilized, and the stability of the cluster can
be guaranteed.
To mitigate the broadcast storm, Dua et al. [137] proposed
a game-based reliable data dissemination protocol in VNs.
Firstly, vehicles (players) communicate with their neighbors
to calculate their payoffs by estimating the stability of the
links. The players dynamically form clusters based on the
regularly updated payoffs, and the CH informs the RSU about
the vehicles in the cluster. For data dissemination, the scheme
can determine the best route from the source to destination
by selecting the link with maximum payoff value rather than
blindly flooding. In the case where the route from the source
and destination is not connected, the nearest RSU will join
this game using the store-carry-forward technique.
Khan et al. [105] proposed an evolutionary game-based
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scheme to improve the throughput and stability of clusters.
This approach employs a semi-distributed clustering method.
On the one hand, the communication throughput of all clusters
is managed centrally by the RSU. On the other hand, the
cluster formation and CHs nomination are automated in a
distributed way. The existence of the equilibrium point is
demonstrated analytically, and its stability is proved with the
Lyapunov function.
To improve the efficiency of channel contention at the MAC
layer, Wu et al. [93] designed a multi-hop routing protocol
for (Vehicle-to-Roadside-unit) V2R communication based on
a hybrid clustering. In this scheme, a coalitional game is
employed to stimulate the vehicles to join a cluster, in which
the CHs act as relays for multi-hop data transmission. An
RSU or CH acts as payoff allocator and distributes payoffs
to its one-hop neighbors who constitute the players of the
game. Therefore, each vehicle would like to cooperate for
data forwarding because only RSU or CH assigns the payoff.
Besides, a fuzzy logic algorithm is designed for dynamic CH
selection by using multiple metrics, such as speed, signal
qualities, and moving patterns of vehicles. By selecting CH for
data forwarding, the number of transmitter can be reduced, and
the channel access contention can be relieved consequently.
2) GT for MAC protocols design: Similar to traditional
wireless networks, the design of the MAC layer protocols for
VNs is challenging due to vehicles’ competition for accessing
the limited bandwidth. Furthermore, some vehicle nodes may
deviate from the MAC protocol to obtain an unfair bandwidth
share. To solve these problems, GT has been applied by
several studies with the purpose of collision alleviation [47],
[78], competition solution [48], [49], and greedy behaviors
prevention [50].
Kwon et al. [78] proposed a Bayesian game-theoretic ap-
proach for the beacon collision alleviation at the MAC layer
in urban VNs. Each selfish or cooperative vehicle makes
individual decisions regarding the power level or transmission
probability based on its payoff. The payoff of each vehicle is
measured in terms of throughput rewards and transmission en-
ergy costs. The authors proved the existence of the BNE of the
game, where vehicles can achieve higher utilities and fairness
compared with the random access. Collision alleviation is also
studied in [47] by designing a MAC protocol that synthesizes
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Carrier Sense
Multiple Access (CSMA) mechanisms. This scheme divides
the time frame into two segments: the TDMA period used for
application data transmission and CSMA period used for slot
declaration. GT is employed to maximize the usage of slots by
deferring the nodes’ choices when two or more nodes reserve
the same slot during the CSMA period.
A medium access algorithm is designed in [48] to solve
the competition for access to the wireless channel of VN. The
concept application value awareness is proposed by assigning
different values to packets according to the waiting time
during the competition so that the nodes with higher packet
values have higher channel access probability. A cross-layer
game model is then constructed for the players (vehicles) to
adjust their channel access probabilities (strategies) based on
their packet values. The equilibrium enables the successful
transmission of the message within the latency limit when
the channel is nearly saturated. The inter-distance between
vehicles and the roles of vehicles are further considered in the
medium access game in [49] to determine a player’s priority
to access the channel.
Greedy behavior prevention in VNs with Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) MAC
protocol is considered in [50] using a game mechanism that
encourages the selfish nodes to behave normally under the
threat of retaliation. The authors proposed group reputation
based and cooperative detection based tit-for-tat strategies to
impose cooperation among vehicles. This adaptive CSMA/CA
protocol can motivate the selfish nodes to cooperate under
the threat of retaliation and is immune to the ambiguous
monitoring caused by collisions.
3) GT for power control: Power and rate control is essential
to avoid congestion caused by the uncertainty of communica-
tions in VNs such as unstable channel, dynamic vehicles, and
varied environments. In VNs, vehicles periodically broadcast
their status in Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), also known
as beacons, to make the neighbors aware of their presence.
Higher power or rate is desired by a vehicle to disseminate
the messages over a larger distance. However, a high level of
power could cause collision or congestion to communication
in dense traffic environments, leading to both performance and
security degradation. Therefore, a good power or rate control
scheme should adapt to varying environments, which should
provide sufficient awareness of surrounding vehicles status
while maintaining low congestion and high security of com-
munication. GT may contribute to the prediction of vehicles
behaviors, and could guide rational choices of vehicles power
or rate according to the environment in VNs.
In [45], the congestion control is designed from the per-
spective of adaptive BSM power adjustment.The algorithm
employs a non-cooperative game G = {N, {Pi}i∈N , {Fi}i∈N},
where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the player set, Pi is the set of
possible beaconing powers of player i, and Fi is the payoff
function. The payoff function of player i is presented as:
Fi (pi, p−i) = Ui (pi) − Ji (pi, p−i)
= ui ln (pi + 1) − cipi1 − CBRi (pi, p−i)
(4)
where ui and ci are positive parameters, and CBRi (pi, p−i)
denotes the Channel Busy Ratio (CBR) sensed by player
i, which is a function of all players beacon power. Based
on the game model, the existence and uniqueness of the
NE are demonstrated theoretically. Furthermore, the scheme
attains stability, fairness, fast convergence, and efficiency in
controlling the congestion below target levels.
Vehicles would reduce both beacon power and frequency
in situations with dense traffic. Although Decentralized Con-
gestion Control (DCC) is a joint beacon rate and power
control mechanism [141], it suffers unfairness and oscillation
[142]. Such problems can be avoided in [46], where a joint
beacon rate and power control game is developed to prevent
congestion in the shared channel. The NE is obtained using
gradient dynamics; the uniqueness and stability of the NE
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SUMMARY OF POWER CONTROL GAMES IN VNS
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[45]
Non-cooperative
game
Beaconing congestion
control
Beacon transmission
power control
Channel load, channel busy ra-
tio (CBR) and price function Theoretic NE calculation
√ √
[46]
Non-cooperative
game
Beaconing congestion
control
Joint beacon frequency
and power control
Channel load, CBR, and price
function NE and gradient dynamics
√ √
[88] Cooperative game
Beaconing congestion
control
Adaptive transmit
power control
Marginal contributions of vehi-
cles towards congestion Shapley value model
√ √
[140]
Non-cooperative
game
Data channel conges-
tion alleviation
Dynamic data rate
adaptation
Data rate and priority of each
vehicle
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions and Lagrange mul-
tipliers
√ √
[51]
Non-cooperative
game
Balance between en-
ergy consumption and
QoS
Adaptive transmit
power control
Throughput, delay, and chan-
nel model
NE,Pareto Optimality and
Social Optimality
√
[99] Bargain game
Information congestion
control for intersection
scenarios
Joint power and packet
generation rate control Channel load
Clustering and CH selec-
tion
√
[52]
Non-cooperative
game
Balance between QoS
and security
Transmit power and the
encryption block length
control
Channel capacity Theoretic NE calculation
√
are proved mathematically. Simulation results indicate that
the fairness of beacon power control can be achieved without
causing extra overheads, and CBR can be controlled at an
appropriate level.
In [88], an adaptive transmit power control for vehicular
communication is developed for vehicles to adapt the trans-
mission powers to local channel congestion. This approach
employs a cooperative game where players (vehicles) coop-
erate and join a coalition during a congestion event. Fair
power adaptation of a vehicle is obtained using the marginal
contributions of the Shapely value model. This power control
scheme could effectively transfer marginal contributions into
a fair power decrease to avoid congestion
Amer et al. [140] proposed a dynamic data rate adaptation
approach based on a non-cooperative game. Each vehicle is
modeled as a selfish player in the game who requests a high
data rate as its strategy. The utility function of each vehicle
is formulated according to vehicles desires for high data rates
(payoff function) and the priority of the vehicle to achieve
satisfied fairness (priority cost function). The optimal game
data rate is obtained by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
and Lagrange multipliers, which could satisfy congestion
mitigation and provide a fair allocation for network resources.
Chen et al. [99] focused on the information congestion
control for intersection scenarios of VNs. The authors designed
a joint power and packet rate adaptation method based on a
bargaining game. Each CH acts as a player in the game and
determines the optimal transmission power and packet gener-
ation rate for its cluster members. The utility of each player
is constructed using channel load monitoring and estimation.
Simulation results demonstrate that the scheme outperforms
IEEE802.11p concerning queuing delay and throughput.
To guarantee the green communication in VNs, Hua et
al. [51] proposed a repeated power efficiency game model
considering the throughput and delay performances of VNs. In
the game, each vehicle performs a packet forwarding strategy,
i.e., power efficiency. Furthermore, NE is presented, and its
efficiency is analyzed using Pareto and social optimality. Based
on NE, each vehicle dynamically adjusts its transmission
power to make a balance between energy consumption and
throughput. Simulation results reveal that the power efficiency
game can provide efficient strategies in green communication.
However, the method does not consider the fairness problem.
Sun et al. [52] proposed an adaptive transmit power and
encryption block length control to balance the QoS and
security by allocating the limited computing resources in VNs.
This scheme is based on a non-cooperative game with a
communication player who controls the transmit power and
a security player who decides the encryption block length.
By calculating NE value, the optimal transmit power and
encryption block length are obtained. However, the game
model is simple because it only focuses on a single-vehicle
without considering the competition or cooperation behaviors
among multiple vehicles.
4) GT for spectrum resources allocation: Fair and effective
spectrum resources allocation has become one of the primary
tasks in VNs due to the selfishness of vehicles and the scarcity
of spectrum resources. Cognitive Radio (CR) [143], [144] is
a spectrum sharing concept which allows unlicensed vehicles
to access licensed spectrum in a non-intrusive manner and is
envisaged as a potential technology to deal with the spectrum
scarcity in VNs. The network formed by those nodes is called
CR-VNs, which aims to enhance the connectivity of vehicles
and improve the utilization of constrained spectrum resources
[145].
Optimal network selection is investigated in [83], where a
spectrum handoff scheme based on auction game in CR-VNs
is proposed. The authors used the decision-making method
with multiple attributes to formulate the cost functions of
players. The proposed scheme adapts to different types of CR
vehicular nodes and multiple available networks. However,
how to extend this scheme to dynamic environments is not
taken into consideration.
In [109], the dynamic channel selection strategy is studied
with the purpose of joint optimizing the infotainment through-
put and spectrum access in VNs. This approach views the
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channel selection as an evolutionary game where vehicles act
as players who continuously select a strategy. Three models
of strategy are considered in this work: 1) always consume
user who chooses the channel randomly, 2) forage-consume
user who senses the channel using the collected information,
and 3) social-forage consume user who sometimes waits and
allows other users access exclusively. The RSU firstly collects
information of vehicles within its range and relays it to the
cloud. Then the cloud computes the optimal and stable strategy
using the evolutionary game and sends the results to RSU. At
last, the RSU broadcasts the recommended strategies to the
vehicles within its radio range. The experiment results show
that a significant improvement in the network performance
can be obtained when vehicles employ evolutionary strategies
recommended by RSU.
Joint allocation of subcarrier and transmit power [100]
is proposed based on NBS to support the enhanced packet
transmission in CR-IoVs. The cognitive vehicular Secondary
Users (SUs) form clusters to opportunistically access the
shared channels, which are allocated to the Primary Users
(PUs) on the condition that the Signal-to-Interference-plus-
Noise-Ratio (SINR) value of the PUs is below the threshold
level. Furthermore, the optimal subcarrier and transmit power
allocation strategies are derived based on the NBS. Besides,
an algorithm with iteration-independence and low-complexity
also ensures the convergence to Pareto optimality.
Considering the inefficiency of the NE, Tian et al. [110]
proposed a channel pricing mechanism using marginal social
cost to motivate selfish vehicular nodes to achieve a social opti-
mum of the spectrum allocation. The authors considered a CR-
enabled V2I communication scenario where the cooperation
between exclusive-used and shared-used spectrum resources is
modeled as an evolutionary game. They further proved that the
NE of the proposed game is evolutionarily stable and coincides
with the social optimum.
III. GAME THEORY IN NEXT GENERATION VNS
Next 5G communication technology provides the potential
to meet the demands of a large number of connected IoT
devices and various data-intensive applications. 5G provides
low-latency, high-reliability, ubiquitous, and energy-efficient
communications [146]. With the rigorous requirements of 5G,
emerging technologies such as edge computing are integrated
into VNs to promote the evolution of current VNs towards 5G-
based VNs. In what follows, the recent contributions of GT
to diverse emerging technologies integrating with VNs such
as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), Heterogeneous Vehicular
Networks (HetVNETs), Software Defined Networking (SDN),
and Unmanned Assisted Vehicles (UAV) are presented.
A. Game Theory in Vehicular Edge Computing
Vehicular Edge Computing (VEC) is an emergent archi-
tecture that offers cloud computing capabilities at the edge
of the VNs to manage the computation-intensive and real-
time tasks with short latency. However, the problems of task
offloading, content delivery, and resource allocation or sharing
are challenging in VEC due to the limited storage capacity of
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), especially in dense traffic
environments where vehicles have quantity service demands.
Furthermore, the lack of complete information between the
tasks and edges makes the problem more complicated. GT,
which is a powerful tool to deal with conflicts, can effectively
address the decision-making concerns among multiple users
who compete for limited resources.
1) Overview of VEC: As is shown in Fig. 3, the three-layer
VEC architecture consists of the cloud layer, edge computing
layer, and vehicular layer. At the edge computing layer, the
implementations for VEC can be classified into MEC, fog
computing, and cloudlet computing [147]. At the vehicular
layer, Vehicular Cloud (VC), as an extension of edge layer
architectures, plays an essential role in assisting the edge layer
or cloud layer with effective resource management.
From the perspective of the participating nodes, edge nodes
are commonly characterized into stationary edge nodes and
vehicular edge nodes [16], which are at the stationary edge
node layer and vehicular edge node layer, respectively.
• Stationary edge nodes An roadside infrastructure such
as RSU and BS connected to a MEC server or a fog
server can serve as stationary nodes. Besides, a cloudlet
consisting of a set of roadside infrastructures also plays
the role of an edge node that provides computation and
storage capabilities to vehicles.
• Vehicular edge nodes Vehicles with available computation
resources and capabilities can form cloudlets or VCs for
resource sharing.
• Hybrid edge nodes Stationary and vehicular edge nodes
coexist in the VEC.
Table. IX presents the types of edge nodes in VEC. The
applications of GT in VEC are discussed from the aspects
of MEC, FC, cloudlet, and VC receptively in the following
subsections.
2) MEC-implemented VEC : Several recent studies use
GT to deal with the optimal decision-making on computation
or task offloading [53], [54], [102], [111] to reduce the
computation delay and overheads. Furthermore, some works
also consider resource allocation by jointly optimizing the
task offloading for vehicles and the resource assignment for
service providers (SPs) [55], [66], [67], [101]. Besides, content
delivery with GT solution in MEC-implemented VEC is
addressed in [81]. Table. X summarizes GT-based schemes
in MEC-implemented VEC.
• Computation or task offloading game
Liu et al. [102] modeled the decision-making of compu-
tation offloading among vehicles as a multi-user potential
game, where each vehicle chooses to use the local computing
or cloud computing to minimize its computation overhead.
The existence of NE is proved, and the performance of the
computation offloading is quantified by the anarchy price.
A cloud-based MEC offloading framework in VNs is pro-
posed in [54] to reduce the transmission cost. This network
scenario consists of M RSUs with the same coverage L, each
of which has a MEC server with limited resources. An efficient
and predictive computation offloading scheme is designed
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Fig. 3. The architecture of VEC (primarily based on [148])
TABLE IX
VEC EDGE NODES
Categories Types of VEC nodes Related works
Stationary Edge Nodes Roadside infrastructure with MEC server [55], [102], [54], [53], [66], [81], [67], [101]
Roadside infrastructure with fog server [149], [85]
Roadside infrastructure cloudlet [56], [57]
Vehicular Edge Nodes Vehicles [112], [103], [58], [59], [106], [68]
SP cloudlet [95], [69]
Hybrid Edge nodes MEC server and vehicles [111]
based on GT, where each vehicle fulfills its computation
task either locally or remotely. The utility of vehicles is
modeled by the mobility of vehicles, the processing time of
the computation tasks, and the offloading costs. By giving NE,
vehicles make optimal offloading decisions to execute tasks
locally or offload them to direct or j-hop-away MEC servers.
To address the load balancing of computation resources at
the edge servers, Zhang et al. [53] proposed a load balancing
task offloading scheme based on two games. Firstly, a game-
based offloading algorithm is designed to optimize vehicles’
task offloading decisions in each time slot. Secondly, the au-
thors proposed a predictive GT-based task offloading algorithm
to estimate the vehicles’ locations by estimating their tasks
processing time, so that the tasks can be executed at the MEC
servers where the vehicles will arrive.
Gu and Zhou [111] focused on the task offloading in ve-
hicular MEC environment with incomplete information (e.g.,
when channel states and vehicle mobility are not completely
available). Firstly, both MEC servers and vehicles with excess
computation capacities are viewed as edge nodes. Besides, the
interactions between tasks and edge nodes are modeled as a
matching game that aims to minimize the average delay of
task offloading and satisfy the energy consumption of edge
nodes.
• Joint task offloading and resource allocation game
Zhao et al. [55] proposed a collaborative task offloading
and resource allocation scheme based on MEC and traditional
Cloud Computing (CC). The network consists of a CC server,
an MEC server with computing resource F, N vehicles,and
M RSUs located along the highway with the same coverage
R. The offloading decisions are made by a game-theoretic
approach. In the game, each vehicle makes decisions to
process the computation tasks locally, offload them to the
MEC server through an RSU, or offload them to the cloud
server. The utility of each vehicle is modeled by metrics
of task processing delay, cost for resource computing, and
the normalized factors. The optimal computation offloading
strategy (based on NE) and computation resource allocation
are obtained by designing a distributed algorithm that works
iteratively between decisions of computation offloading and
resource allocation.
Considering that there exists competition among MEC
servers when deciding their optimal resource price to make
more profit, an optimal multilevel offloading scheme [66] is
designed by formulating the interaction between vehicles and
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MEC servers as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the MEC
servers are the leaders who dynamically assigned computing
resources to vehicles through an incentive method. MEC
servers’ strategies are the amount of resources bought from the
resource pool and the price of their resources sold to vehicle
players. On the other hand, vehicles act as followers who make
the optimal offloading decisions by dynamically reacting to
the resource prices advertised by MEC servers. The existence
of the NE is proved, and an optimal offloading algorithm is
designed to maximize the revenue of the service providers and
meet the delay constraints of the tasks.
The security protection in the VEC environment is ad-
dressed in [101] by designing a reputation management
scheme for the SP to allocate resources to vehicles based
on their reputations. An SP scheduled multiple MEC servers
to process computation offloading requests of vehicles; each
MEC server runs a Virtual Machine (VM). For allocating com-
putation resources, a bargaining game is formulated where the
SP acts as a decision-maker who sets resource budgets based
on the reputation and requirements of vehicles. Furthermore,
each vehicle determines the amount of offloaded computations
according to the budgets issued by the SP. This scheme not
only guarantees optimal computation offloading for vehicles
but also improves the detection of misbehaviors with low
detection rates.
An energy-efficient VEC framework is developed by inte-
grating big data with VEC [67]. A Stackelberg game-based
energy-efficient resource allocation strategy is designed to
solve the workload offloading problem. Similar to the scheme
in [101], the game is played by edge computing SPs and
vehicles in two stages. In the first stage, the RSU issues its
computing service price based on the service revenue. In the
second stage, each vehicle optimizes its offloading proportion
based on the issued price and the edge computing time and
electricity cost. This scheme guarantees energy efficiency
and satisfies both QoS and Quality of Experience (QoE).
Moreover, handover for MEC switching connections among
RSUs is also considered to enhance service delivery capability.
• Edge content dissemination game
In [81], the authors developed an auction game-based two-
stage model for edge content dissemination in urban VNs.
Firstly, the provider uploads the content to the Edge Comput-
ing Devices (ECD), where the content is cached temporarily.
Then a two-stage game is designed for ECD to select the
optimal relay. In the first stage, a first-price sealed-bid auction
game is developed for ECD to select relay vehicles with high
transmission capability. Then the cached contents are delivered
to these candidate vehicles through V2I communication. In the
second stage, these candidate relays transmit the contents to
the destination vehicle. Simulation results show that this incen-
tive content dissemination scheme outperforms conventional
methods.
3) FC-implemented VEC: Like MEC, FC can also enable
edge computation by implementing a decentralized computing
infrastructure based on heterogeneous and collaborative fog
nodes (e.g., access points, routers, and IoT gateways) placed
at any point in the architecture between the end-user devices
and the near-user edge devices [147]. As vehicular fog is
also a resource-intensive component with limited resources,
GT can be used for proper and fair computation and resource
allocation for Vehicular Fog Computing (VFC) networks in re-
cent researches. Table. XI summarizes the GT-based schemes
of computation or task offloading and resources allocation in
MEC-implemented VEC
Zhang et al. [85] modeled the resource allocation in the
software-defined VFC network as a mean-field game. The Fog-
Small BSs (F-SBSs) are seen as players aiming to optimize
the power control according to the payoff functions. The
payoff function of an F-SBS is formulated by metrics of
downlink capacity, energy, interference, and caching reward.
The game can help vehicles to choose the satisfying F-SBSs
with optimal power control. Furthermore, Sutagundar et al.
[150] proposed a game-based resource allocation algorithm for
fog enhanced vehicular services. Each fog has multiple VMs
which act as players in the game and compete for resources
to provide service for the requested vehicles. The algorithm
enables proper resource allocation for vehicles within one hop
of the RSU; once the vehicle gets connected to the next RSU,
the VM migrates from one fog instance to another to provide
the continuity of service.
In [112], a VFC framework with low-latency and massive-
connectivity is designed to relieve the insufficient computation
capability of BS and reduce the processing delay. A two-
sided matching game is designed for the task assignment,
where vehicles with idle resources act as Vehicular Fog Nodes
(VFNs). VENs can share their resources so that computation
tasks of User Equipment (UEs) can be offloaded to these fog
nodes. By combining contract and matching theories, Zhou et
al. [113] further developed a two-stage computation resource
allocation and task assignment scheme to minimize the delay
and guarantee QoS and QoE for UEs. In the first stage, an
incentive model is designed motivate vehicles to sign the
contract of resource sharing. In the second stage, vehicles
negotiate an agreement with the BSs in the previous step serve
as VFNs. Then a pricing-based stable matching is designed
for resources assignment between UEs and VFNs based on
the dynamic preference lists.
In [103], parked vehicles perform as fogs to allocate re-
sources for applications of local mobiles with different QoS
requirements. Firstly, the application demands are classified
into high priority (HP) demands and low priority (LP) de-
mands. Then the parked vehicles play a distributed potential
game to efficiently allocate the fog resources to satisfy the
applications’ demands while minimizing the latency and the
number of redirected requests to the cloud.
Location privacy-preserving in VFC networks is studied in
[149]. The authors presented pseudonym fogs, each of which
consists of a set of roadside infrastructures and is deployed
nearby vehicles. These pseudonym fogs play a real-time
pseudonym change game interactively to allocate pseudonym
resources to nearby vehicles. This scheme improves the vehi-
cles’ location privacy with reduced pseudonym management
overheads. One disadvantage of this scheme is that it does not
apply to situations with sparse vehicles.
4) Cloudlet-implemented VEC: As is shown in Fig. 3, a
cloudlet in VNs is a trusted cluster of roadside infrastructures
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Computation or Task Offloading Game
[102]
• Decrease computation over-
head
• Select a proper wireless
channel for each vehicle
Potential
Game Vehicles
Wireless channel selec-
tion for offloading Uplink data rate
MEC
servers
√ √
[54]
• Reduce latency and offload-
ing cost
• Make optimal offloading
decisions
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
Execute tasks locally or
offload them to MEC
servers
• Average offloading
costs of vehicles
• Tasks processing
delay
• RSUs
with MEC
servers
• A cloud
server
√ √ √ √ √ √
[53]
• Load balancing
• Minimize the processing de-
lay of all the computa-
tion tasks under delay con-
straints
• Jointly optimize the selec-
tion of MEC servers and
vehicles task offloading de-
cisions
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
• Offloading decision
– Computes locally
– Offloads to MEC
server
– Offloads to cloud
server
Tasks execution time
and data transmitting
time
• RSUs
with MEC
servers
• A cloud
server
√ √ √ √
[111]
• Minimize the task offload-
ing delay
• Satisfy energy consump-
tion of vehicles and edge
nodes
Matching
game
Task and
edge
nodes
Task matching
• Task: offloading de-
lay
• Edge nodes: energy
consumption
• RSUs
with MEC
servers
• Vehicular
edge
nodes
√ √ √ √ √ √
Joint Task Offloading and Resource Allocation Game
[101]
• Provide security protection
using reputation manage-
ment
• Optimize resource alloca-
tion for service providers
• Optimize computation of-
floading for vehicles
Bargaining
game
SP with
MEC
servers
and
vehicles
• SP: Resource budgets
• Vehicles: Amount
of requesting
computation resources
• SP: Sum of resource
budgets
• Vehicles: total
processing delay
of computation and
cost for service
• RSUs
with MEC
servers
• BSs with
MEC
servers
√ √ √ √ √
[55]
• Optimize computation of-
floading for vehicles
• Optimize resource alloca-
tion of MECs and cloud
• Decrease the system com-
plexity without loss of the
performance
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
• Computes locally
• Offloads to MEC
server
• Offloads to cloud
server
• Task processing de-
lay
• Cost of computation
resource
• Normalization factor
• A MEC
server
• A cloud
server
√ √ √
[66]
• Optimal resource allocation
– Backup resources shar-
ing among MEC servers
– MEC servers dynami-
cally assign their re-
sources to vehicles
• Satisfy the delay constraints
of tasks
Stackelberg
game
MEC
servers
and
vehicles
• Vehicles: Choose the
offloading target MEC
servers
• MEC servers:
– the amount of the re-
sources bought from
the BCS
– price of their re-
sources sold to vehi-
cles
• Vehicles: total time
cost task offloading
• MEC servers: rev-
enue of the resources
• RSUs
with MEC
server
• A cloud
server
√ √ √
[67]
• Dynamic resources alloca-
tion to guarantee:
– Energy efficiency
– QoS guarantee
– QoE guarantee
• Optimal computation of-
floading
Stackelberg
game
SPs and
vehicular
users
• SP: Service provision
revenue and electricity
consumption
• Vehicles: proportion
of resources to offload
• SP: service provi-
sion revenue
• Vehicles: edge com-
puting time and elec-
tricity cost
• RSUs
with edge
controllers
• A cloud
server
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Edge Content Dissemination Game
[81]
Select the relay vehicles to
satisfy different transmission
requirements
Auction
game
ECD and
vehicles
• ECD: Candidate relay
vehicles selection
• Relay vehicles: Opti-
mal bid selection
• ECD: Transmission
capabilities of the
• Vehicles: Bid and re-
lay cost
RSUs with
ECDs
√ √ √ √ √
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[85]
• Optimal serving point
selection
• Optimal power control
of small base stations
Mean-
field
game
Fog
small
base
stations
Transmit power
• Value function
• energy
• interference
• downlink capac-
ity
• catching reward
• A macro BS
with fog server
• Small BSs with
fog servers
• a cloud server
√ √ √ √
[150]
• Prediction of resources
required and the avail-
ability of resources
• Fair and efficient fog
resources allocation for
vehicles
Non-
cooperative
game
VMs The amount of resourcesallocated
Estimation of
amount of
required resources
• RSUs with
VM-based fog
servers
• A cloud server
√ √ √ √ √
[112]
• Relive overload on BSs
• Reduce total network
delay
Matching
game
UEs and
vehicles UE-VFN pair matching
• Total delay
• Price for using
the resources of
VFN
Vehicular fog
nodes
√ √ √
[113]
• Minimize total delay
• Motivate vehicles to
share resources using
contract incentive
• Optimal task assignment
Matching
game
UEs and
vehicles
Pricing-based UE-VFN
pair matching
Expected social
welfare
Vehicular fog
nodes
√ √ √ √
[103]
• Minimize the latency
and optimize the utiliza-
tion of computation and
energy
• Allocate fog resources
dynamically
Potential
game
Fog ve-
hicles
• Do not satisfy any type
of demands
• Satisfy only HP de-
mands
• Share the computation
• Satisfy only LP de-
mands
• CPU and energy
utilization
• Task processing
time
Parked fog vehi-
cles
√ √ √ √
[149]
Secure pseudonym
changing management
with low overhead
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles
Change pseudonym
or maintain current
pseudonym
• Vehicle-side en-
tropy
• Pseudonym
change cost
• Pseudonym
fogs with
roadside
infrastructures
• A cloud server
√ √ √ √ √ √
(e.g., RSU and BS) with resources available to use for vehicles
near form them [151]. The infrastructure nodes in a cloudlet
can share resources; different cloudlets can coordinate and co-
operate for communication. Table. XII summarizes the recent
researches employing GT in cloudlet-implemented VNs.
To operate the resource allocation of cloudlets, Yu et al.
[56] defined a new paradigm of 5G-enabled VNs, an enhanced
cloud radio access network, which integrates geo-distributed
cloudlets with SDN and D2D technologies. The authors ex-
ploited the matrix GT for cloudlet resource allocation and gave
explicit solutions to global optimization. The study in [57]
designs an RSU cloud resource allocation scheme based on
a non-cooperative game. To deal with the low efficiency of
the convergence at NE and to achieve the near Pareto-optimal
flow allocation, the previous one-shot game is extended to
a repeated game where the punishment of misbehaviors is
considered to avoid selfish vehicles deviating from the co-
operation.
The authors of [95] proposed a coalition game model to
stimulate cloud SPs cooperatively form coalitions to share
their idle resources. Firstly, each SP evaluates its revenue and
decides whether to join a coalition in the cloud. Then in each
coalition, the two types of players act as 1) the inviters who
would like to rent resources Rf rom and 2) the invitees who
would like to lease out their resources Rto. By using a two-
sided matching game, the inviters and invitees match their
demands effectively and form stable coalitions cooperatively.
The coalition is proved to be Dc stable, and Pareto optimal
solution is the only stable solution.
Different from the works mentioned above, vehicles are
viewed as a dynamic extension of cloudlets and share com-
putation resources to cloudlets in [69]. The authors designed
a Stackelberg game to stimulate vehicles to trade in their
computation resources with a cloudlet SP. After obtaining the
vehicles’ states from the cloud server, the cloudlet SP first
sets the optimal discriminatory price for the trade based on
the computation demands of the vehicles. Then each vehicle
decides the computation amount it will buy from cloudlet SP
according to the giving price. The existence and uniqueness
of NE are proved, and the solution has good scalability for
more participating vehicles.
5) VC in VEC: A variety of services are provided to
vehicles in VNs, which may cause inefficient utilization of re-
sources. For example, the resources of parked vehicles are idle,
while the vehicles in congested areas compete for insufficient
resources. In this context, VC has emerged as a promising
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 13, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2014 18
TABLE XII
SUMMARY OF GAMES FOR CLOUDLET-IMPLEMENTED VEC
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[56]
• Resource sharing among
the geo-distributed
cloudlet
• Improve resource utiliza-
tion and reduce power
consumption
Non-
cooperative
game
RSU cloudlets The amount of re-sources allocated
Resources Utilization
• CPU resource
• memory resource
• bandwidth resource
RSU
cloudlets
√ √ √ √
[57]
Effective flow rate assign-
ment
Non-
cooperative
game
Vehicles Flow rate allocated toeach vehicle
Transmission efficiency RSU
cloudlets
√ √ √
[95]
Stimulate cloud SPs to
form coalitions for re-
sources sharing
Coalition
game
inviters and
invitees
• inviters: rent re-
sources
• invitees: lease out
resources
• inviters:
– satisfaction function
– rent payment
• invitees:
– satisfaction function
– rental income
SP
cloudlets
√ √ √ √
[69]
Stimulate vehicles to share
computation resources to
cloudlets
Stackelberg
game
A cloudlet SP
and individual
vehicles
• Cloudlet SP:
discriminatory
price
• Vehicles: computa-
tion trading amount
• Cloudlet SP: cost of rent-
ing
• Vehicles: benefit of the
trading
SP
coudlets
√ √ √ √ √
solution to the exploitation of underutilized resources by
integrating VNs with CC. However, resource management
of VC is more challenging compared with traditional CC
because high mobility of vehicles may lead to ”cloud resource
mobility”. Moreover, communication in VC is more vulnerable
to attacks than that in traditional VNs because a large number
of users share the resources. GT has been employed by recent
studies in the decision-making of resource management or
security protection for VC-implemented VEC. Table. XIII
summarizes the works applying GT in VC-implemented VEC.
The study in [106] focuses on a hybrid wireless network
access scheme in VC networks based on an evolutionary game.
Vehicles cooperate to form a temporary cloud to share the
resources (i.e., being a consumer or resource provider) or act
alone to access to the conventional cloud. Each vehicle can
change its strategies from the conventional cloud to the VC
or inversely according to its payoff. To model the evolution
of vehicles’ strategies, the authors developed an evolutionary
game that allows vehicles to determine to access conventional
or vehicular clouds.
The study of [68] developed an opportunistic V2V compu-
tation offloading scheme based on a two-player Stackelberg-
game. In the game, each vehicular acts either as an SP
with idle computation resources or a requester who has a
computation-intensive task that can be carried out locally or
offloaded to nearby providers. The payoff functions involve the
metrics of vehicular mobility, V2V communication duration,
computational capabilities, channel conditions, and service
costs under both circumstances of complete information and
incomplete information. The method can determine the ap-
propriate offloading rate, optimal SP selection, and the ideal
pricing strategies of SPs.
To handle the service management in VCs, Aloqaily et
al. [58] proposed a cooperative distributed game between
vehicular drivers and SPs. The game aims at maximizing the
SP’s social utility while ensuring the vehicle driver’s QoE,
taking into account the efficiency of the service allocation and
fairness among SPs. Considering the different preferences of
SPs and consumers, Brik et al. [59] proposed a distributed
game-based approach to model the interaction between con-
sumer vehicles and provider vehicles for effective service
allocation. In this game, SPs rent out their resources, and
each consumer vehicle selects the optimal SP vehicle who
can provide him services with satisfied QoS and cost.
B. Game Theory in Heterogeneous Vehicular Networks
The HetVNETs apply the heterogeneous access technolo-
gies to provide ubiquitous connections to vehicles. As is shown
in Fig.4, HetVNETs provide both V2I and V2V communica-
tions with Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Dedicated Short-
Range Communication (DSRC) technologies, respectively.
The dynamic and instant integration of different technologies
pose challenges to HetVNETs, such as resource management
[60], [152], efficient channel access [?], [82], [96], [97], and
security protection [86], [153].
1) Resource allocation: Recently, CR technology has been
integrated into HetVNETs for efficient utilization of spectrum
resources [152]. Xiao et al. [60] investigated the radio resource
allocation in HetVNETs by designing a game-theoretical ap-
proach. The downlink resource allocation for moving vehicles
linking to different RSUs is modeled as a n-person non-
cooperative game. The game aims to optimize resource al-
location and mitigate interference dynamically in terms of the
interference among RSUs and the power constraints of RSUs.
The fast-convergent equilibrium of the game is obtained, with
which the performance of the HetVNETs can be improved.
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[106]
Optimal wireless network
access
Evolutionary
game
Conventional
vehicle and
VC member
• Access to
conventional cloud
• Cooperate to be mem-
ber in VC
• Conventional Vehicle:
– Amount of data received
– Payment for the service
• VC member:
– Data downloaded from
other VC members
– Handover cost
• VC
with
eNB
• A
cloud
server
√ √ √ √ √
[68]
• Determine appropriate of-
floading rate of requestors
• Select the appropriate
computation SP
• Identify the ideal pricing
strategy for SP
Stackelberg
game
A task vehi-
cle and one of
the server ve-
hicles
• Task vehicle: the
amount of offloaded
data
• Service vehicle: ser-
vice price
• Task vehicle:
– task processing delay
– payment for service
• Service vehicle: service
price
VC
with
RSU
√ √ √ √
[58]
• Fair resources allocation
• QoS and QoE guarantee
Non-
ooperative
game
Vehicular
driver and
service
provider
Cooperate or reject to
cooperate Social welfare function VC
√ √ √
[59]
Select the optimal provider
vehicles to meet the QoS of
consumer vehicles
Non-
cooperative
game
Consumer
vehicle and
provider
vehicle
• Consumer vehicle:
consume or not
• Provider vehicle: offer
or not
• Data throughput
• Successful execution ratio
• Execution duration
• Execution price
VC
√ √ √ √
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Fig. 4. The architecture of HetVNETs [21]
2) Optimal Access Control: Optimizing the connection for
vehicles with the lowest cost is challenging in HetVNETs,
where different access technologies cause different costs in
terms of download latency and bandwidth utilization. An
always-best-connected paradigm [82] based on the signal game
is designed to help vehicles in HetVNETs connect to the
optimal network with a low connecting cost. However, this
approach only considers a two-player competition case in a
limited geographical area in urban scenarios. Hui et al. [96],
[97] proposed an optimal access control for vehicles using
a coalitional game. This method formulates the cooperation
among vehicles based on their interests (contents cached in
vehicles) and requests (contents to be downloaded). Vehicles
in the same coalition can download the requested contents
cooperatively with the minimum costs.
Although the researches mentioned above ensure the con-
nection of vehicles in HetVNETs, they do not consider the
unexpected massive handoffs caused by constant changes of
networks. However, the facts such as crowded mobile vehicles,
high sensitivity to delay, and packet loss make the traditional
vertical handoff strategies ineffective in HetVNETs. To solve
this problem, [61] et al. proposed an optimal non-cooperative
game approach for network selection in HetVNETs where
performance parameters of networks are changing. Vehicles
in the game attempt to switch to the network with higher
evaluation, and the probabilistic strategies drive them toward
a final stable convergence state.
3) Security: Security in HetVNet is a challenging issue
due to the vital exchanged information such as congestion,
accidents, hazards, etc. Sedjelmaci .et al. [153] designed a
new attack detection and prediction scheme based on GT to
detect and predict the misbehavior of a malicious vehicle in
HetVNETs. The attackdefense problem is first formulated as a
game between the attacker (i.e., misbehavior vehicle) and the
services center. Furthermore, the future behavior of monitored
vehicles can be predicted based on the NE. To alleviate the
channel congestion on intersections in HetVNETs, Chen et
al. [86] proposed a congestion game-theoretical transmission
control scheme with a new concept RoS (Requirement of
Safety) used to measure the security level of services.
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C. Game Theory in SDN-based VNs
By decoupling the network management from message
transmission, SDN technology facilitates the efficient utiliza-
tion of network resources [154]. Existing SDN technologies
include three types of structures: VN-based, cellular network-
based, and hybrid architectures, among which hybrid structure
can leverage the uncertain latency of ad-hoc networks and the
cost of cellular networks. Li et al. [70] focused on leveraging
the latency requirement of vehicles and the costs of cellular
networks. A two-period Stackelberg game is designed for
the interaction between the controller (leader) and vehicles
(follower). The NE of the game gives the best strategies of
the controller and vehicles, which are the optimal bandwidth
allocation and the number of packets to be sent through the
cellular network, respectively. Besides, an intelligent network
selection scheme for data offloading is designed in [71] using
a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. The authors
of [72] also employed a two-stage Stackelberg game for
the optimal network selection in the SDN-based VNs with
heterogeneous wireless interfaces.
Considering the frequent handover when a lot of vehicles are
connected to an RSU, Jia et al. [107] proposed a BUS-aided
RSU connection scheme in SDN-IoV. The scheme employs
an evolutionary game where the vehicles in the overlapped
regions of the RSUs can adopt the optimal strategies to access
to stable RSUs or BUSs. In [155], the assignment of network
virtualization solutions in SDN-VNs is modeled as a non-
cooperative game, of which the Pareto efficient solution is
obtained. Alioua et al. [73] focused on the edge-caching prob-
lem in SDN-IoV by modeling the interaction between Content
Provider (CP) and Multiple Network Operators (MNOs) as a
Stackelberg game. The CP acting as a leader is responsible
for publishing the quantity of content to be cached; the MNOs
acting as followers respond to the leader subsequently based
on caching price.
D. Game Theory in UAV-assisted VNs
As an important and emerging element of IoT, UAV-assisted
VNs can improve infrastructure coverage, enhance the network
connectivity in resource-limited scenarios, and reduce the de-
ployment cost. As is shown in Fig. 5, UAV enables three types
of communication modes: UAV-assisted V2V communication,
UAV-assisted V2I communication, and UAV networks [19].
However, due to the multihop communication from UAVs to
infrastructures or vehicles and the dynamic of UAVs, the VNs
may suffer QoS degradation and security threats. GT has been
used in formulating decision-makings in security [62], [79] and
QoS [79], [79] aspects in UAV-assisted VNs.
Xiao et al. [62] proposed an anti-jamming relay game
between the UAV and jammer for jamming resistance in the
UAV-assisted VNs. In the game, the UAV determines whether
to relay the OBU’s messages to an RSU beyond the jammer,
and the smart jammer attempts to attack by adjusting its
jamming power. Moreover, NE is derived as a guide for
a UAV to make the best UAV relay strategy for jamming
resistance in VNs according to the channel condition and the
transmission cost. The security problems of intrusion detection
and attacker ejection in UAV-assisted VNs are discussed in
[79]. A Bayesian game is adopted to formulate the attack-
defense interactions between the IDS and attackers to detect
attacks with high accuracy and low overheads,
Besides security problems, GT is also applied in balancing
QoS and resource consumption in UAV-assisted VNs. In [63],
the computation offloading is formulated as a two-player
sequential game to balance the computation offloading delay
and waste of energy in emergency situations in UAV-assisted
VNs with less or no infrastructure. Besides, a mode selection
scheme is proposed in [108] based on an evolutionary game.
Each vehicle in the game selects the best communication mode
from V2I, V2V, and Vehicle-to-UAV (V2U) in UAV-assisted
VNs to maximize the transmission reliability while minimizing
the cost of resource utilization.
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Fig. 5. Architecture of UAV-assisted VNs [19]
E. Game Theory in Other 5G-technology-based VNs
Besides the above mentioned 5G-based technologies, GT
is also employed in VNs integrating with other 5G-based
emerging technologies. The content sharing problem in the
D2D based V2X communication networks is studied in [114],
where the interaction between vehicles and eNBs is modeled
as the stable matching game. Besides, to address the bandwidth
slicing problem in SDN-based cellular networks, Zhou et al.
[74] developed a hierarchical game framework to model the
competitive interactions between internet service providers
and users. Moreover, in [115], GT is used in dynamically
pair vehicles and optimize both transmission and reception
beamwidths in Millimeter-Wave (mmWave) V2V communica-
tion. The congestion game is applied to solve the congestion
in spectrum sharing VNs based on Licensed Shared Access
(LSA) technology in [87].
IV. CHALLENGES
Possible future research directions of GT approaches related
to VNs may consist of several aspects as follows:
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A. Handover Management in Game
GT has shown its potential for effective handover handling
in VNs by modeling the network selection or resource man-
agement as games [61], [83], [107]. However, the massive
handovers in next-generation VNs make the design of game
models a challenging task. For example, vehicles may fre-
quently switch among different types of networks (e.g., LTE
and DSRC), move from one access point (e.g., RSU or edge)
to another, or locate in the overlap among ranges of different
networks or access points. Firstly, GT face the challenges of
modeling 1) competition among vehicles for scarce resources,
2) cooperation among vehicles to form trustful coalitions (ve-
hicles in the same coalition are connected to the same network
or access point), and 3) coordination among access points
and vehicles for effective resource allocation. Furthermore,
cooperative GT employed in seamless VM migration is an
emerging solution for handovers but also a challenging task
that requires effective interactions among access points. On
the one hand, sufficient prior knowledge about vehicles, espe-
cially the trajectory information, is a prerequisite for effective
cooperation so that the content can be cached in advance along
with the vehicle. On the other hand, the cooperation must be
efficient with low complexity and communication overhead for
real-time VM migration.
B. Big Data Management in Game
With the ever-increasing number of connections, infor-
mation exchanges, and various applications, the data vol-
ume collected, transmitted, and processed in VNs has seen
tremendous growth, resulting in the emergence of big data
[17]. The integration of temporal and spatial big data in
the game-theoretical design of VNs remains an open issue.
Firstly, considering the resources of big data, the game will
involve multiple types of players, such as vehicles, roadside
infrastructures, and UAVs. What makes the problem more
complicated is the recently proposed space-air-ground inte-
grated VNs [156], where the satellites are deployed in UAV-
assisted VNs. Besides, the multi-tier (i.e., central clouds,
edges, and vehicles) and heterogeneous networks (e.g., LTE
and DSRC) incur large strategy spaces for the players. In
this case, players should implement the information gathering
and storing mechanism to make better decisions. Although
storing more valuable data could increase the re-utilization
of data, processing data with high-volume, high-velocity, and
great-heterogeneity causes high storage costs and long delay
Therefore, the trade-off between the cost of data processing
and the value of big data should be considered in modeling the
utility functions of the players. Mean-field game [157] could
be a possible solution that provides a powerful mathematical
tool for modeling the interaction among rational agents with
massive exchanged information.
C. Fair Resource Allocation
Fairness is a critical metric of resource allocation (e.g.,
bandwidth, power, and frequency) in VNs to prevent resource
starvation caused by unfair resource allocation. Although most
studies focus on the effectiveness of resource allocation, the
shared-medium, limited-resource, and high-mobility natures of
VNs pose challenges to guarantee fairness among competitive
users of resource allocation. Firstly, fair resource allocation
in VNs potentially becomes more complex when the network
suffers interference of multiple vehicles, especially in high-
density scenarios. Secondly, with increasing demands for
various applications with stringent QoS requirements in VNs,
it is challenging to ensure both fairness and efficiency of
resource allocation. Consequently, a trade-off between fairness
and efficiency should be considered by designing fairness algo-
rithms with acceptable computational complexity. Last, how to
flexibly and fairly manage resource allocation in the dynamic
and instant composition of different networks in HetVNETs is
also a critical problem [21]. Nash bargaining game has been
used for fair resource allocation in wireless networks such as
LTE networks [158], self-organizing heterogeneous networks
[159], and MEC [160] networks.
D. Uncertain and Incomplete Information in VNs
As is discussed before, most of the works modeling the
rational behaviors of players (e.g.., vehicles and RSUs) in
VNs as complete information games by assuming that the
players know entirely other players’ information. However,
the knowledge acquired by players about their opponents is
incomplete and uncertain in VNs, which leads to inaccuracy
of game models. On the one hand, due to the highly dynamic
networks, it is difficult for players to acquire complete infor-
mation about their opponents. On the other hand, the security-
or privacy-sensitive data is processed by mechanisms such
as encryption and pseudonym, which can not be acquired by
other players either. The application of GT with incomplete
information in VNs is emerging to help players estimate
the unknown information based on the belief models (i.e.,
probability distribution [34]). Bayesian game is useful for
scenarios with limited or highly variable context information
and has been applied by a few studies. However, to build
accurate beliefs on other players, the complex probabilistic
model should be constructed, which causes large overheads
and delay for the real-time vehicular communications. More
studies are required to utilize GT with incomplete information
to build cost-efficient and accurate beliefs on the participants
in VNs.
E. Security in VNs
As is discussed in this paper, the applications of GT
for the security problems (e.g., intrusion detection, privacy-
preserving, and trust management) in VNs mostly focus on
modeling attackers, malicious or selfish nodes with assumed
finite strategy spaces. However, it is not sufficient to protect
the security of life-related communications in VNs due to the
following limitations. Firstly, it is difficult for the defenders
or legitimate players to obtain complete information about
the payoffs and strategies of attackers. Although some studies
apply the incomplete information game, it is an assumption of
players’ types or preferences. Secondly, one of the limitations
of GT in modeling the players is that the agents are rarely
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entirely rational. Thirdly, the terms such as ”security level”,
”privacy level”, and ”attacker strength” quantified manually
with some equations may not be entirely accurate. Machine
learning provides new insights for intelligent authentication in
5G [161] and malware detection schemes of IoT [162], which
could be combined with GT for security strategy prediction
and attacker model in the process of decision making in VNs.
Especially, the Reinforce learning (RL) is a typical example
that does not require players to know anything about other
players [163].
F. Efficiency of Game
In non-cooperative games, NE is usually not efficient due to
the lack of information about all players (i.e., each player only
has the local information about a given player such as channel
gains). Therefore, each participant gains an individual payoff
selfishly. In contrast, cooperative games have information
about all players in a coalition, where the joint payoff is
shared among the members in the alliance. However, designing
cooperative schemes is a challenging task. The players in a
cooperate game should agree on an enforceable agreement
before starting the game. Threat or punishment is required for
agreement mechanisms to force the players to comply with
the commitment [164]. Therefore, a central controller such as
an RSU is required for collectin complete information and
execute the enforced commitments and punishment policies.
However, it could be challenging to satisfy this requirement in
the environment where the deployment of roadside infrastruc-
tures is limited. Besides, cooperation stimulation and selfish-
ness mitigation are critical but challenging when modeling the
effective resource competition in VNs. Last but not least, the
following aspects of GT should also be carefully considered
in the game: 1) the result of GT should be precise and valid
[165], 2) the model of GT should be efficient with limited
complexity [166], and 3) the prediction capability of GT could
be improved using learning theory [165]
V. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a summary of recent developments of
GT applied in VNs, discussing the applications of GT in
the existing VNs and the future vehicular communications
integrated with 5G mobile network technologies. After briefly
introducing the concepts of relevant terms of GT, the current
game theoretic-approaches used to solve the challenges in VNs
are comprehensively surveyed from the perspectives of QoS
(e.g., routing selection, power control, and spectrum resources
allocation) and security (e.g., intrusion detection, privacy-
preserving, and trust management). Furthermore, we survey
the works of GT employed in next-generation VNs integrating
with emerging 5G technologies such as edge computing,
heterogeneous networks, UAV-assisted communications, and
SDN technologies. Finally, the remaining challenges and the
corresponding future researches applying GT in VNs are
discussed.
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